Peter Ship

Informant management needs to better exploit technology

Over recent years sharing of intelligence by police forces and the security services has become increasingly important and in the wake of a range of Government initiatives there is no doubt that that the intelligence picture across the UK has improved.

My concern however is the gap that ‘covert intelligence’ leaves in this brave new world of intelligence sharing. At the highest level, intelligence sharing in respect to terror threats is dramatically improved. However at every level above the GPMS restricted level a huge amount of useful information sits untasked and unavailable to authorities across the UK.

Whilst I understand the need to keep sensitive information secure I feel that the UK is still suffering from the twin hangover of retaining sensitive information because: we are yet to fully grasp the ideal of sharing unless there is a reason not to and because of the perceived burden of desensitising and disseminating intelligence.

I feel a little of the poacher turned gamekeeper here, because over the second half of my police career I was responsible for the very things I am highlighting here. As an informant controller I presided over a system that contained a vast amount of intelligence that was never acted upon. Given that informants are employed to provide ‘hard to obtain’ information, this is clearly a significant gap. I accepted that that the information that is acted upon or shared is generally the most important or relevant intelligence, however the gap still remains. If suspect A was seen driving a car with registration No ABC 123 by a beat officer it would be placed into the forces primary intelligence system and shared with others. However if that information was provided by an informant I would be far less confident that it would be shared.

How many forces or agencies disseminate intelligence obtained from surveillance operations? How much legacy data obtained in major or sensitive enquires remains unshared, even following prosecution when the information effectively becomes ‘public knowledge’.

Technology allows organisations to create a simple but secure work flow process which enables information no matter what the source, to be safely aggregated with ‘restricted’ intelligence to provide a complete intelligence picture of what is known, not just by a single agency but nationally.
We still await a holistic approach to the management, sharing and use of information especially that contained in covert and sensitive databases.

In order to achieve this there needs to be a shift from the more traditional hiving off and siloing of information. The technology is there, now we just need attitudes to catch up – a step that will transform intelligence across the UK to better deal with today’s realities.



Comments

To be honest there have been significant changes in the area of CHIS management over the last several years and the culture of 'not sharing' intelligence that comes from CHIS's is rapidly diminishing. Most modern Confidential Units transfer the sanitised intelligence that comes from CHIS intervention in to their main Intelligence systems automatically using the latest covert tools. Many CU's also now proactively use the data they have in their core Source Management systems to overlay against Crime data to better utilise CHIS deployment and specialism matching. In today's environment, it is all about proactive decision making with covert assets.

Peter I agree that this continues to be an area of weakness and also feel slightly awkward as, like you, I presided over the very structures and systems that you highlight as problems.

Whilst it was previously a concern, I no longer consider this to be a hearts and minds issue as I see very little evidence of a reluctance to share information originating from confidential or secret sources. Furthermore, I get the sense that officers are increasingly aware that failure to make the appropriate disseminations leaves them as an individual, or the organisation as a whole, vulnerable to criticism.

That’s not to say that this is happening across the board and significant obstacles to effective dissemination exist. As I see them, the blockers are lack of technology, organisational structures and adopted working practices.

Structures and working practices can change and indeed are changing and there are many current examples of the blurring of what were previously very bold and rigid boundaries between covert /secret operations and mainstream policing.

However, clearly the pace of change when it comes to technology is much slower and this is the crucial point of your blog - it is the lack of technology that hampers progress!

As I indicated earlier, failure to disseminate appropriate intelligence brings risk, however the risk associated with compromising a secret or confidential source though inappropriate dissemination is arguably much greater. The protection of such sources is a strategic challenge requiring organisations to invest in the type of technology that Peter highlights, provide the necessary tools to support their staff in this critical area and provide for the safe sharing of information.

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